What Determines the Formal Versus Relational Nature of Local Government Contracting? by Meeyoung Lamothe & Scott Lamothe
Urban Affairs Review
48(3) 322 –353
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1078087411432418
http://uar.sagepub.com
432418 UAR48310.1177/1078087411432418
Lamothe and LamotheUrban Affairs Review
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
1University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA
Corresponding Author:
Meeyoung Lamothe, The University of Oklahoma, Department of Political Science,  
455 W. Lindsey, Room 205, Norman, OK 73019-2001 
Email: mlamothe@ou.edu
What Determines  
the Formal Versus  
Relational Nature  
of Local Government 
Contracting?
Meeyoung Lamothe1 and Scott Lamothe1
Abstract
In this article, we examine the governance structures used to manage local 
service delivery contracts with an eye toward two specific concerns. First, 
we contend that public managers likely use dual regimes in which contract 
writing is more formal in nature than is the management style adopted 
during contract implementation. We also explore the determinants of such 
mechanisms. We find some evidence to support our contention in that man-
agers frequently contact and communicate with their vendors despite the 
presence of clearly and formally written contracts. We further find that the 
formal versus relational nature of written contract features is influenced by 
different factors (service characteristics, market conditions, vendor owner-
ship) than is management style (reputation, management capacity, expecta-
tions of continuing relationships).
Keywords
contracting, relational contracting, formal contracting, governance, local 
service delivery
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In the local government contracting literature, two of the most common ques-
tions have been why do jurisdictions contract for services (the make-or-buy 
decision) (e.g., Ferris and Graddy 1986; Greene 1996; Hefetz and Warner 
2004; Kodrzycki 1998) and, when they contract, what determines whether 
they choose to go with for-profit, nonprofit, or other government vendors 
(sector choice) (e.g., Brown and Potoski 2003a; Ferris and Graddy 1986; 
Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2008; Levin and Tadelis 2010; Stein 1993). 
Recently, however, as interorganizational resource exchanges become a 
prevalent practice in both the private and public sectors, scholars’ interests 
have shifted from simply choosing between hierarchy-or-market prototype 
governance modes toward exploring the nature of the relationships among 
exchange partners and different management strategies emerging from their 
interactions. Notably, scholars conceptualize two contrasting governance 
regimes regulating interorganizational relations: formal and relational gover-
nance (Adler 2001; Hill 1990; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Uzzi 1997). Formal 
governance, as the name implies, relies heavily on detailed, formalized con-
tracts that explicitly lay out expectations and sanctions. Relational gover-
nance, on the other hand, is looser and depends more heavily on norms of 
cooperation to ensure task completion and to protect the property rights of 
participants.
While there has been a tendency in the literature to dichotomize the 
relational versus formal governance question as an “either/or” proposition 
(Amirkhanyan 2009), more recently, scholars have begun to identify and 
theorize about a variety of mixed governance models that go beyond this 
bifurcation. Some directly test whether formal and relational governance 
methods function as mutually enhancing rather than competing mechanisms 
for different types of services (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002; 
Vandaele et al. 2007). Others point out that formal and relational manage-
ment practices may coexist (Van Slyke 2007). For example, in her study of 
performance measurement, Amirkhanyan (2009, 546) finds that “joint deci-
sion making [a form of collaboration associated with relational governance] 
may in fact validate and enhance the existing [i.e., formal] contract monitor-
ing procedures.”
The goal of this study is to add to this literature by exploring the determi-
nants of governance mode with an eye toward two specific concerns. First we 
present evidence, in-line with the contentions of scholars such as Van Slyke 
(2007) and Amirkhanyan (2009), that how contracts are written and how they 
are managed might vary in ways that indicate the coexistence of formal and 
relational mechanisms. Second, we examine what determines the extent 
of such regimes. While many studies have theorized as to why formal or 
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relational governance may be preferable or, to a lesser extent, have examined 
the prevalence of such modes, few have empirically examined the determi-
nants of these structures. Our study starts to fill this lacuna. In doing both, we 
rely on an original survey conducted by the authors that gathers information 
on how local governments manage their contracted services.
The remainder of the article is laid out as follows: We begin our inquiry 
by examining the two contrasting governance patterns (formal vs. relational) 
recognized in the literature, to include a discussion of the literature support-
ing the idea of the coexistence of these regimes, as well as why such coexis-
tence makes sense in light of the obligations of government. Next, we explore 
factors that could affect how and when differing forms of governance might 
be chosen, keeping in mind that the effect of the factors might vary depend-
ing on whether we are talking about contract writing or management style. 
We then review the data gathering, research design, and techniques used in 
our analyses. This is followed by a discussion of the findings and their impli-
cations. Finally, we close with avenues for future research and concluding 
comments.
Literature on Governance: 
Dichotomous or Mixed?
As mentioned, the two distinctive patterns to describe (or prescribe) inter-
organizational resource exchanges are formal and relational governance 
(Poppo and Zenger 2002; Vandaele et al. 2007). Formal governance relies 
heavily on “detailed, binding legal agreements that specify the obligations 
and roles of both parties in the relationship” (Vandaele et al. 2007, 240). 
Such contracts are typically written with “highly specific deliverable output 
in a tightly specified time frame” (Sclar 2000, 101) and explicitly lay out the 
sanction mechanisms that may be used straightforwardly if one party does 
not fulfill its commitments (Macneil 1978). The primary purpose of formal 
contracts is to protect the rights and properties of potentially opportunistic 
participants. As such, altruistic behavior is not expected and aggrieved par-
ticipants utilize third-party remedies, such as courts, to resolve problems 
(Ring and Van de Ven 1992). Formal contracts are, at their extremes, char-
acterized as “sharp in/sharp out” and resemble spot markets in that there is 
no expectation of an ongoing association among the participants of such 
transactions, given the assumption of the ample presence of potential suppli-
ers and buyers in the market (Macneil 1978).
Relational contracts or, more broadly, relational governance since not all 
resource exchanges take contractual forms in these types of relationships are, 
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on the other hand, less rigid than their formal counterparts, with the key com-
ponents being flexibility, cooperation, and information sharing (Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). Maintenance of the relationship, as opposed to simple dispute 
resolution, is a primary concern; hence legal, third-party remedies are not 
preferred (Carson, Madhok, and Wu 2006). Rather, there is an expectation of 
ongoing communication and coordination over the lives of such contracts. 
When problems occur, as they are expected to (Macneil 1978), they are dealt 
with in ways that focus on salvaging and continuing the relationships and the 
partners are expected to be adaptable (Beinecke and DeFillippi 1999). One of 
the major reasons for the focus on cooperation and maintenance of the rela-
tionship is that the parties to such contracts often see themselves as essen-
tially dependent upon one another (Sclar 2000). Taken to the extreme, 
relational contracts resemble “clans” in which individual and group goals are 
in close alignment (Ouchi 1980). We summarize the core attributes of formal 
and relational governance structures that we extract from the literature in 
Table 1.
The bifurcated view of governance discussed above implicitly supposes 
that formal and relational structures are somewhat mutually exclusive. From 
this perspective, formal and relational governance are thought of as sub-
stitutes in that informal agreements between exchange partners based on trust 
and reputation can supplant the detailed legal maneuvers involved in formal 
contract negotiation (Adler 2001; Gulati 1995; Larson 1992). Some research-
ers draw a more explicit contrast and assume a hostile relationship between 
formal and relational varieties of governance by arguing that strict adherence 
to formal control may hinder trust-building processes and thus work against 
relational governance (Ghoshal and Moran 1996) and increase opportunism 
(Bernheim and Whinston 1998).
In their well-cited study, Poppo and Zenger (2002) challenge the mutual 
exclusion thesis and argue complementary roles of formal and relational gov-
ernances. According to their contention, formal contracts do not discourage 
relational governance. Rather, clear and specific contracts, in conjunction 
with commitments to ongoing associations promote cooperation among 
exchange partners by reducing risk. Formal structure is argued to be espe-
cially useful in the early stages of exchange where mutual trust based on 
repeated and continuous performance has yet to be built. Goo et al. (2009) 
confirm Poppo and Zenger’s position (i.e., complements rather than substi-
tutes) as they find that well-developed service-level agreements in formal 
contracts are positively associated with relational governance attributes such 
as harmonious conflict resolution and an emphasis on mutually beneficial 
relationships.
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Table 1. Summary of the Characteristics of Formal and Relational Governance 
Modes
Governance Mode
Attributes
Formal (classical, contractual, 
complete) governance Relational governance
Perspectives about relations 
with vendors(Beinecke and 
DeFillippi 1999; Macneil 
1978; Ouchi 1980; Ring 
and Van de Ven 1992, Sclar 
2000)
•  Anticipate short-term  
relationship;
• Low risk/low trust;
•  No expectation for  
altruistic behavior.
•  Anticipate long-term  
relationship, seek out 
trustworthy partners;
• High risk/high trust;
•  Expect altruistic behavior  
in the interest of the 
whole;Mutual dependency.
Market assumptions 
(Beinecke and DeFillippi 
1999)
• Many vendors available. • Few potential vendors.
Contract writing(Beinecke 
and DeFillippi 1999; Lee 
and Cavusgil 2006; Macneil 
1978; Poppo and Zenger 
2002)
•  Detailed specification of  
benefits, burdens, rules, 
and rights;
•  Monitoring for  
compliance;
•  Reliance on legal  
remedies;Sharp in/sharp 
out.
•  Comparatively ambiguous  
contracts with anticipation 
of adapting to changing 
circumstances;
•  Social norms serve  
as principal mechanisms of 
mediation or control;
•  Aversion to third-party,  
legal remedies.
Management style(Macneil 
1978; Ouchi 1980; Poppo 
and Zenger 2002; Vandaele 
et al. 2007; Van Slyke 2007)
•  Sanctions imposed as  
written;
•  Low levels of contacts  
and coordination;
•  Compliance a key 
concern.
•  Sanctions and  
remedies not imposed 
but rather negotiated and 
mediated;
•  Flexibility,  
solidarity, information 
sharing.
•  Maintenance of  
relationship a primary 
concern.
Service characteristics 
(Brown and Potoski 2003a; 
Williamson 1985, 1991)
•  Easy to define service  
tasks;
•  Easy to evaluate  
service quality and 
vendor performance;
•  Tasks do not require  
special investment or 
customization and 
involve standardized 
service production 
processes—incumbents 
not advantaged.
•  Ambiguity in defining  
service tasks;
•  Difficult to assess  
service quality and vendor 
performance;
•  Vendors are required to  
make special investment to 
satisfy buyers’ customized 
needs—incumbents 
advantaged.
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While the studies mentioned above are from the private sector, nondi-
chotomous understandings and characterizations of governance emerge in 
the public administration and public management literatures as well, although 
the explicit testing of such models has not been as intensive. In their study of 
Kansas social service privatization experiments, for example, Romzek and 
Johnston (2002) find that well-planned and prepared contracts as well as 
ongoing “negotiation and collaboration among contracting partners” (p. 423) 
are necessary conditions for effective contract implementation. Likewise, 
Van Slyke (2007) reports that New York state and county government man-
agers often use both formal and informal contract management and monitor-
ing tools to steer their social service vendors. More specifically, the 
governments in his study adopt a variety of formal oversight mechanisms 
such as financial auditing, quality assurance, and monitoring site visits in 
their contracts, but they also actively engage in informal control activities 
involving frequent contact, feedback, information sharing, and communica-
tion with service providers and are slow to invoke formal sanctions when 
noncompliance or nonperformance occurs. Similarly, Amirkhanyan (2009) 
observes the common practice of joint decision making between local gov-
ernments and their vendors in developing performance measures by which 
contractors are evaluated and concludes that her findings call into question 
the utility of dichotomizing governance patterns along the formal–relational 
spectrum.
The above discussion leads us to believe that public managers may adopt 
both formal and relational attributes in governing their contracts. Specifically, 
it seems plausible that contracting governments might write their contracts in 
ways that differ from how they actually manage them. As DeHoog (1990) 
points out, because of accountability concerns, government officials tasked 
with oversight functions may prefer formal controls, while those tasked with 
program management often desire flexibility. Hence, the expectation is that 
dual regimes may be in place in which written documents that conform to the 
precepts of formal governance are augmented with relational management 
practices.
What Determines Governance Patterns?
In general, we expect that the extent of formality in written contract features 
and management style are both shaped by various service, vendor, and juris-
dictional characteristics. However, some of these factors might have differ-
ent effects on structuring written contract terms as opposed to managing 
vendors once contracts are in place.
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The Determinants of Written Contract Features
Examining contract features centers around the degree of clarity and legality 
built into contract terms and conditions. For example, how clearly and spe-
cifically are service tasks, performance measures, and sanction clauses laid 
out in contract documents? How frequently is open bidding required as a 
formal contract term to enforce market discipline? We suspect that conven-
tional arguments regarding service characteristics, vendor traits, and jurisdic-
tional factors play significant roles in determining public managers’ ability 
and willingness to pursue formalness.
Service characteristics. In the contracting literature, the nature of services 
has been a key variable in explaining local governments’ decisions on gover-
nance (Brown and Potoski 2003a; Domberger and Jensen 1997; Ferris and 
Graddy 1986; Stein 1993). While the early literature recognizes various 
service characteristics in this regard (e.g., economies of scale, vendor avail-
ability, ease of monitoring; see for example, Ferris and Graddy 1986), 
Williamson’s (1985) measurability and asset specificity dimensions based on 
the transaction costs economics (TCE) framework are used most extensively 
to classify services (Brown and Potoski 2003a, 2005; Ferris and Graddy 
1991; Hirsch 1991; Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2008). Measurability has 
to do with how easy or difficult it is to describe exactly what tasks are to be 
undertaken and to measure and gauge performance. Asset specificity relates 
to specialized knowledge or resources that are required for service delivery or 
which may accumulate over the term of a contract and advantage the incum-
bent in subsequent procurement rounds. As challenges regarding measurabil-
ity and/or concerns regarding asset specificity increase, the transaction costs 
to write, manage, and monitor contracts are amplified (see Williamson 1985). 
Low transaction services are often termed “hard services,” while high trans-
action costs services are described as “soft services” (Amirkhanyan 2009; 
DeHoog 1990; Marvel and Marvel 2009; Sclar 2000).
This understanding of hard versus soft services, based on their transaction 
costs characteristics, has long served as a basis for the “discriminating align-
ment hypothesis” (Vandaele et al. 2007, 239) in governance study, positing 
that different production arrangements should be used for services with dif-
ferent levels of transaction costs to tap into the potential for efficiency gains 
(Brown and Potoski 2003a; Williamson 1985, 1991). Similar arguments have 
been made regarding the question of whether formal or relational contracting 
is more appropriate. Specifically, hard services are said to be best suited for 
formal contracting because of their fitness to clearly structured contracting 
environments and competitive market conditions (Vandaele et al. 2007). As 
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such, contracts for hard services should explicitly lay out service tasks and 
sanctions while contracts for soft services should use flexible language that 
allows for ex post adjustments to handle the ambiguous and uncertain nature 
of service tasks. In sum, we expect that as the nature of services moves from 
hard to soft, the features of written contracts will move from formal to 
relational.
Vendor characteristics. Vendor traits such as ownership and reputation are 
also argued to affect governance decisions (Brown and Potoski 2003a; Hefetz 
and Warner 2004; Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2008; Van Slyke 2007). 
The common underlying factor determining where contracts fall on the for-
mal–relational spectrum in this instance is the extent to which contractors are 
perceived as trustworthy. Trust is considered a core component of relational 
contracting (Poppo and Zenger 2002); therefore, trusted vendors should tend 
to be governed more relationally, all else held constant. Nonprofits are gener-
ally seen as more trustworthy than their profit-seeking business counterparts 
because of their nondistributive nature and purported goal alignment in the 
delivery of public services (Frumkin 2002; Hansmann 1987; Jang 2006; Sal-
amon 1995; Smith and Lipsky 1993; Weisbrod 1977). Historically, public 
agencies tend to view nonprofits as partners in delivery more so than generic, 
replaceable vendors (Sclar 2000). In addition, nonprofits see themselves 
more as stewards of the public interest than contract agents looking for 
opportunities to promote their own interests (Van Slyke 2007). The literature 
is not as enlightening regarding other government vendors. However, it is 
conceivable that they are seen in manners similar to nonprofits or per-
ceived to be even more trustworthy since they share the same institutional 
characteristics.
Independent from ownership, vendor reputation may also signify trust-
worthiness to contracting governments who then may use such information 
as a tool to control vendor opportunism, mitigating the need for highly formal 
control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This is because reputation is a valuable 
commodity that helps firms retain business (Milgrom and Roberts 1988) and 
vendors can be expected to regulate their own behavior, even when they are 
not being watched, to avoid tarnishing an asset they have worked hard to 
develop.
Related to the above discussion is whether resource exchange participants 
generally foresee a continuing relationship or not. Expectations of continuity, 
regardless of their source (i.e., forced upon the partners by market conditions 
or because the participants see constancy as mutually beneficial), have been 
posited to impact the nature of the partnership. Borrowing from game theory, 
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scholars such as Poppo, Zhou, and Ryu (2008) argue that cheating can be 
mitigated if firms anticipate an ongoing relationship in which continued 
cooperation has a higher payoff than short-term opportunism (see Axelrod 
1984 for an exposition of how cooperation can be expected to develop). In 
such instances, some of the ex ante costs associated with formalizing con-
tracts might be avoided because it is presumed that the vendor will not likely 
take advantage of the contracting government, since doing so is counterpro-
ductive in the long run. Similarly in the public management literature, 
Milward and Provan (2000, 372), in discussing the commonness of ongoing 
relationships in social service contracting, state that “stability promotes a 
belief that cooperation will have a reasonable payoff.” Consequently, con-
tractors have less incentive to act against the interests of their principals when 
continuity is anticipated. When vendors are seen as potentially long-term 
partners in service delivery, relational patterns may prevail in contract 
writing.
Jurisdictional factors. In addition to transaction costs and vendor character-
istics, it seems likely that the attributes of jurisdictions also play a role in 
formally structuring contracts. For example, Brown and Potoski (2003b, 156) 
posit that “council-manager governments are more likely to invest in contract 
management capacity than those governed under alternative arrangements.” 
While they focus on whether jurisdictions do such things as conduct privati-
zation feasibility studies or perform citizen satisfaction surveys, their logic 
would seem to extend to whether locales have the resources and expertise 
necessary to write exacting requests for proposals and contracts, as required 
under formal contracting regimes. Hence the expectation is that council–
manager governments tend to develop more formal contracts.
Another jurisdictional trait that might be influential is metro status. As 
Honadle (2001, 82) points out, urban jurisdictions may tend to have higher 
levels of internal capacity and, even when this is not the case, the overall 
capacity of rural governments may be diminished because they “do not have 
. . . complementary institutions in the community” to augment their capacity. 
This lack of capacity could make it challenging for rural locales to undertake 
the tasks associated with formal governance. For example, Mohr, Deller, and 
Halstead (2010) find that rural jurisdictions less frequently utilize competi-
tive bidding processes, which are, in many ways, a key component of formal 
contracting. Hence, contract writing in rural communities should be less for-
mal than it is in higher capacity urban areas. The literature is not overly 
instructive regarding how suburban jurisdictions should compare with urban 
governments. However, extending the logic regarding rural governments 
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explicated above, it seems reasonable to expect that the suburban–urban rela-
tionship will mirror the rural–urban relationship although the magnitude of 
the differences should be mitigated.
The final jurisdictional factor to discuss is the market environment. 
Regardless of service characteristics, vendor ownership, or jurisdictional 
capacities, we expect less formal contract writing in areas with weak vendor 
markets. This is a specific application of the more general argument that mar-
ket conditions are associated with governance modes in a rather straightfor-
ward way—when markets are robust, formal contracting is indicated, when 
they are weak, relational contracting is expected to be more efficacious 
(Beinecke and DeFillippi 1999; DeHoog 1990; Sclar 2000). The logic is that 
competitive markets serve to allow for arms-length, sharp-in/sharp-out con-
tracting since replacing vendors is easy and cheap. There is no need to expend 
scarce resources on building relationships because market discipline effec-
tively constrains vendor opportunism. While rural areas might tend to have 
weak markets across the board, even large jurisdictions may suffer such 
problems on a service-by-service basis. Whenever thin markets are encoun-
tered, more relational forms of governance are expected.
The Determinants of Management Style
As mentioned previously, we expect management style to be more flexible 
and collaborative (i.e., more relational) than what contract features indicate 
as public managers may see needs to adapt to changing environments after 
contract terms are formally codified. Generally, we predict that many of 
these adjustments will fall within the broad boundaries set by formal contract 
structures and are influenced by the same factors shaping written contracts. 
That is, hard service contracts with clear language regarding contractors’ 
obligations and sanction clauses enable, and to a degree compel, public man-
agers to be more faithful to the legal structures they create. On the other 
hand, the ambiguity characterizing soft service contracts may force managers 
to become more relational in nature to allow for the flexibility and adjust-
ment, which, in many ways, will simply be a necessity. Similarly, when there 
are anticipations of continuing relationships or few vendors in the market, 
more relational management styles are predicted. These expectations are 
heavily driven by the idea of dependence. If the contracting government feels 
the provider would be very difficult to replace, regardless of whether it is 
because they perceive them as partners or they are simply “stuck” because of 
market conditions, maintenance of the relationship may be of paramount 
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importance. Formal, arms-length styles of managing contracts under such 
circumstances would seem inappropriate.
Divergence is expected when hypothesizing how ownership and jurisdic-
tional characteristics affect public managers’ management style, as compared 
to contract writing. Previously we posited that well-trusted vendors should be 
governed under more relational styles. We adhere to this assertion when con-
sidering such factors as reputation and nonprofit status of vendors that are 
indicative of trustworthiness. When other governments are contractors, how-
ever, the traits these types of vendors share with nonprofit contractors (e.g., 
nonditributive nature, goal congruence) might not necessarily lead to what 
appear to be relational management practices, especially in terms of how 
commonly public managers coordinate and communicate with vendors in 
implementing outsourced services. Recent empirical findings suggest that 
public managers tend to treat other government contractors differently from 
private for-profit as well as nonprofit vendors in that they display significant 
degrees of deference and institutional trust toward their fellow government 
vendors (Lamothe and Lamothe 2010). This intimate sharing of identity may 
result in a completely “hands-off” approach rather than frequent contacts and 
coordination in managing contracts.
Lastly, regarding jurisdictional characteristics, we argue that locales with 
high capacity, as might be revealed by the presence of professional managers 
and metro status, should be more likely to communicate with vendors during 
implementation but less likely to exercise discretion when issuing sanctions. 
We expect the reverse for low capacity locales. The logic is straightfor-
ward—high capacity indicates the existence of resources that can be deployed 
to efforts at information sharing and coordination, which may increase the 
probability of successful contracting, making such activity desirable. On the 
other hand, when capacity is low, public managers lack the resources for 
“hands-on” management and thus should participate in less coordination. 
This diverges from dichotomous expectations on governance in that high 
capacity, in this instance, is expected to lead to relational rather than formal 
management styles, despite the potential presence of formally written con-
tracts. However, we do not expect high capacity will increase the use of dis-
cretion in sanctioning since, as we argue above, professionalized governments 
should tend to write more explicit contracts that unambiguously lay out ven-
dor expectations, performance measures, and sanction procedures. When 
transgressions occur, both sides are aware of the procedures and conse-
quences, mitigating the need for costly negotiations and thus reducing 
rather than increasing the use of discretion in sanctioning. Meanwhile, less 
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professionalized government with low capacity are less likely to have written 
highly formalized contracts; thus, when problems are encountered, they will 
necessarily have to be more willing to negotiate settlements as sanctioning 
terms and mechanisms are not fully developed. Taken together, the above 
arguments lead us to posit that professionally managed locales should exer-
cise sanction clauses as written, but engage in more contacts and coordina-
tion (because they can). Conversely, rural and suburban jurisdictions should 
engage in less communication but exercise more discretion when imposing 
sanctions.
Data Collection
We purchased a contact list from the International City/County Managers 
Association (ICMA), which maintains a database containing contact infor-
mation for approximately 10,300 municipalities and counties in the United 
States. ICMA’s list contains 1,519 governmental units with populations of 
50,000 or greater (660 cities and 859 counties). It also contains 8,751 juris-
dictions with populations less than 50,000. While most jurisdictions provide 
hard services, such as solid waste collection, fewer municipalities and coun-
ties provide soft services, such as health and human services. Since we posit 
that service characteristics play an important role in governance choice, we 
felt it best to limit our sample to larger jurisdictions that would be more 
likely to provide a wider array of services through a variety of arrangements 
(Levin and Tadelis 2010). We requested 2,000 contacts—all jurisdictions of 
50,000 or greater and a random sampling of those ranging from 25,000 to 
49,999. Surveys were sent to each unit in our sample during the week of 
January 20, 2010. Reminder post cards were sent on February 10, 2010. 
During the week of February 24, the survey package was sent out again to 
all nonresponding jurisdictions in the hopes of receiving additional responses.
Each jurisdiction was asked to choose two services it delivers through 
contractual arrangements, one from a list of hard services and one from a list 
of soft services (see Appendix A for the lists), and answer a series of ques-
tions about the selected services and their related governance characteristics 
(Appendix B contains a catalog of the survey questions asked and how they 
relate to the variables used in the analysis). We use ICMA’s classifications of 
public works/transportation and health and human services to define our hard 
and soft services, respectively. Most variables are measured on 5-point scales 
presenting opposing statements at each end of the formal–relational spec-
trum.1 The statements on the left, or low end of the scale, represent answers 
that should, by theory, be associated with formal governance and those on the 
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right, or high end, with the purported expectations of relational contracting 
practices. Each case represents a jurisdiction’s response for a given service—
a government–service pair.
In the end we received responses from 359 jurisdictions, for a response 
rate of 18.0%.2 Of the responding jurisdictions, 69 indicate they do not con-
tract for either type of service and 17 include no suitable information. In 
addition, some cases were missing data on variables relevant to our analyses. 
Because of these limitations, the number of jurisdictions included in our 
models range from 250 to 253, depending on the variables associated with the 
models. Since we ask for information on two services, the maximum number 
of cases theoretically possible runs from 500 to 506, depending on the analy-
sis. However, many jurisdictions only reported information for one service 
(most commonly the hard service), usually indicating they do not contract for 
the other type. So, in the end, the number of cases that could potentially be 
included in our analyses is 345 (with a total of 223 hard and 122 soft service 
cases), with actual Ns running from 339 to 345, depending, again, on the 
model.
As with any sample, there are questions as to the representativeness of our 
data. Turning to Appendix C, we see that our data set vastly oversamples 
jurisdictions with larger populations. As mentioned above, this was by 
design. However, it still has implications for the generalizability of this study. 
Our data are dominated by jurisdictions in the 50,000 to 249,999 population 
range, which are not representative of the overall distribution of local govern-
ments in the country. Thus, our findings are more relevant to medium to large 
locales. Our findings may not translate well to small jurisdictions (especially 
those with populations less than 10,000). We also undersample north-central 
and oversample western jurisdictions. It is not clear what, if any, implications 
there are for interpreting our results, but readers should be aware of this con-
cern. Finally, council–manager forms of government are also overrepre-
sented. This could make it challenging to find relationships between form of 
government and governance modes, since we have limited variation on this 
variable. It could also call into question how generalizable our findings are to 
other forms of government.3
Measurement of the Dependent Variables
To examine governance patterns, we collect five variables, three that tap into 
the characteristics of written contract documents and two that focus on man-
agement styles. All are 5-point scales, where the high end represents answers 
that point to relational governance (please see Appendix B for a more detailed 
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review of how the dependent variables used in the analysis are coded). The 
three contract feature variables ascertain if contracts are rebid regularly, 
regardless of incumbent performance; if the contract explicitly spells out 
deliverables, performance measures, and reporting requirements; and 
whether the contract includes sanction clauses that specify detailed penalties. 
Enumerated rebidding schedules force the government to go back to the 
market periodically, which is important in imposing market discipline—
simply doing a good job is not enough to shield the vendor from possible 
replacement. Unambiguous language regarding vendor performance expec-
tations, in combination with clear explication of sanctioning triggers and 
mechanisms, serve to plainly and legalistically define the government–ven-
dor relationship. Contracts that have these characteristics are formal in 
nature. As contracts deviate from such configurations, they move toward the 
relational end of the continuum.
The management style variables define the frequency of contacts and 
coordination with the vendor during contract implementation and if sanctions 
are imposed as written in the contract with little discretion or negotiation. 
Frequent contacts and communication during contract implementation imply 
a willingness to share information, jointly solve problems, and coordinate 
actions. They are also indicative of a generally more “hands-on” manage-
ment style. Hesitance to mechanistically impose sanctions when transgres-
sions occur implies a preference to maintain relationships over a legalistic 
focus on protecting property rights. As such, high levels of contacts during 
contract execution and exercising discretion when imposing sanctions are 
hallmarks of relational governance.
Factor-analyzing dependent variables. If singular governance mechanisms 
are in place, the five variables discussed above should correlate positively. 
For example, if the contract features point to formal mechanisms (e.g., 
explicit task definitions and sanction mechanisms), then the management 
style variables should also (e.g., limited contacts and coordination and ready 
application of sanctions). In other words, all the variables should code toward 
the low end of the spectrum. The reverse, of course, would be expected if 
relational attributes are identified. However, if as we posit, both formal and 
relational modes coexist, the contract features and management style vari-
ables should not track well together.
To test this proposition, we entered the five variables into a principal com-
ponents factor analysis. As the results in Table 2 show, the model produces 
two, rather than a single, factor. The three contract features variables (i.e., 
Frequency of rebidding, Contract specificity regarding deliverables, and 
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Contract specificity regarding sanction clauses) all load nicely on the first 
factor, indicating they are tapping into a single dimension that defines how 
contracts are written. Contacts and coordination loads negatively and weakly 
on the first factor, but strongly on the second factor, signaling that it is captur-
ing a different facet of the governance structure—an aspect of how contracts 
are actually managed during implementation. Things are a bit more compli-
cated for Use of discretion in sanctioning. It loads moderately well, and at 
nearly the same magnitude, on both factors, indicating it does not really 
“belong” to either. We interpret these results as evidence for the coexistence 
of formal and relational governance structures.
Based on the results of the factor analysis, we construct three dependent 
variables for use in the next part of our analysis—an examination of the 
determinants of governance structures. The first, Contract features, is an 
additive scale computed by summing the scores for the three component vari-
ables (thus the variable ranges from 3 to 15). The second and third dependent 
variables capture components of management style and are simply the 
Contacts and coordination and Use of discretion in sanctioning measures; 
hence these variables each range from 1 to 5. We choose to go with the above 
variable constructions, rather than with factor scores, because Use of discre-
tion in sanctioning is conceptually different than the variables making up 
Contract features and it does not obviously, from an empirical perspective, 
belong to either factor, so maintaining it on its own allows us to explore if the 
different measures have unique determinants.
Table 2. Principal Components Factor Analysis of Governance Structure Variables
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2
Contract features  
 Frequency of rebidding 0.704 −0.006
 Contract specificity regarding deliverables 0.828 −0.034
 Contract specificity regarding sanction clauses 0.872 −0.078
Management style  
 Contacts and coordination −0.191 0.895
 Use of discretion in sanctioning 0.539 0.502
Eigenvalue 2.268 1.061
Percent variance explained 45.36 21.21
Total variance explained 66.57%
N 338
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Independent Variables,  
Control Variables, and Models
The independent variables of interest used in the analysis include transac-
tion cost service characteristics, vendor traits, and jurisdictional factors as 
described in the “What Determines Governance Patterns?” section. Readers 
are directed to Appendix B for detailed discussions of how the variables are 
constructed. In addition, while we posit that how contracts are written and 
how they are managed might diverge, it is likely that contract terms, in and 
of themselves, are influential, at least to some extent, in determining man-
agement patterns; hence this variable needs to be accounted for in our man-
agement style models. In many ways, this is mostly a control variable, but it 
also serves as a further test of our thesis regarding the coexistence of formal 
and relational governance mechanisms. Strong positive relationships with 
our management style dependent variables would tend to refute our claims 
(especially if very few or no other independent variables prove to be signifi-
cant), whereas insignificant or negative coefficients would strengthen them.
Finally, we include three control variables, not previously discussed. 
Political connections defines the level of political connections the vendor 
has. While it is not obvious that such connections should lead to specific 
types of governance, it does seem probable that well-connected vendors 
might be treated differently in some way owing to the fact that they can call 
on their political benefactors to protect their interests if they run into prob-
lems in delivering services. As such, controlling for this property seems pru-
dent. We also account for the type of government and the size of the 
jurisdiction. County identifies county, as opposed to municipal, governments. 
Finally, Population measures jurisdictions’ populations in millions. Please 
see Table 3 for a presentation of the descriptive statistics for all of the vari-
ables included in the analysis.
Since Contract features is an additive scale that runs from 3 to 15, we use 
ordinary least squares to estimate this model. On the other hand, both 
Contacts and coordination and Use of discretion in sanctioning are 5-point 
ordered variables, so we use ordered logit to run these models.4 As we posit 
the same independent variables are at play in determining each of the depen-
dent measures, this leads to the following general model specifications:
Contract features/Contacts and coordination/Use of discretion in 
sanctioning = b1Service measurability + b2Asset specificity +  
b3Nonprofit + b4Other government + b5Reputation +  
b6Expectation of continuity + b7Professional administrator + b8Rural + 
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b9Suburban + b10Few vendors + b11Contract features* +  
b12Political connections + b13County + b14Population + e.
*Only included in the Contacts and Coordination and  
Use of Discretion in Sanctioning models.
The above models imply triangular systems of equations. That is, the 
dependent variable from the first model, Contract features, is thought to 
affect the dependent variables in the subsequent equations (Contacts and 
coordination and Use of discretion in sanctioning) but not vice versa. Hausman 
tests indicate that the systems are recursive.5 Therefore, modeling them as 
three separate equations is appropriate.6
Results
In Table 4, we report the results of our three analyses into the determinants of 
the formal versus relational characteristics of contract governance structures. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
Contract features 3 15 7.561 3.484
Contacts and coordination 1 5 3.953 1.091
Discretion in sanctioning 1 5 3.127 1.158
Measurability 2 10 4.580 2.177
Incumbent advantage 1 5 3.257 1.329
Nonprofit 0 1 0.266 0.443
Other government 0 1 0.092 0.289
Trusted vendor 1 5 3.786 1.083
Reputation known 1 5 3.938 1.016
Community ties 1 5 3.615 1.220
Expectation of continuity 1 5 3.976 1.012
Professional manager 0 1 0.740 0.439
Suburban 0 1 0.385 0.487
Rural 0 1 0.157 0.364
Few vendors available 1 5 3.509 1.369
Political connections 1 5 2.717 1.235
County 0 1 0.491 0.501
Population 0.026 9.519 0.220 0.764
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To ease interpretation, we have included the posited relationships in paren-
theses after each independent variable name. Turning first to the Contract 
Features model, one sees that service characteristics, vendor characteristics, 
and jurisdictional factors all play a role in determining how contracts are 
written.
Service characteristics seem especially important. Both Service measur-
ability and Asset specificity are positively and significantly related to the 
written contract features, as posited, indicating that as services become harder 
to define, performance becomes more difficult to evaluate, and vendors 
become more challenging to replace because of concerns with asset specificity, 
contract writing becomes more relational in nature. Substantively speaking, 
Service measurability is notably more impactful, after accounting for its scale.7
The sector of the vendor also proves to be an important indicator of the 
formalness of contract terms. As hypothesized, when contracting with other 
governments, public managers tend to write more relational-style contracts 
than when they contract with for-profit vendors. Next to Service measurability, 
this is the most substantively impactful variable in the model. Contrary to 
expectations, however, contracts written for nonprofits do not appear to be more 
or less formal than those written for their profit-earning counterparts. Finally 
regarding sector, other governments are also distinguishable from nonprofits 
in terms of contract features—contracts with other governments score toward 
the higher end of the relational spectrum (b
Other government
 – b
Nonprofit
 = 2.308, 
p = 0.000).8 This would appear to lend support to the proposition that public 
managers show deference to contractors from the same sector (Lamothe and 
Lamothe 2010; Marvel and Marvel 2007).
The vendor’s reputation and whether there is an expectation of an ongoing 
relationship do not appear to have independent influences on contract writing 
in terms of the formal–relational aspects of the contract. The idea that capac-
ity is associated with contracting characteristics is also not well supported. 
Council–manager forms of government are not statistically related to the 
dependent variable, nor are suburbs more likely than urban areas to opt for 
relational terms. Only Rural achieves even a marginal level of significance. 
Substantively, this variable has the weakest effect of the statistically signifi-
cant variables. Finally, the market environment does appear to play a role in 
defining contract terms The more limited the government perceives the ven-
dor market to be, the more relationally contracts are written.
Fewer variables are related to the first management style variable, Contacts 
and coordination, and generally they are not the same ones that affected 
Contract features except for the asset-specific characteristics of services. 
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From a substantive perspective, a 1-unit increase in this variable is associated 
with increasing the probability of Contacts and coordination scoring 5 by 
5.5 percentage points (see the “Impact” column), which represents a 15.3% 
increase over the baseline probability.9 This is one of the weaker associations 
in the model.
Vendor ownership does not seem to matter much, but the contractor’s 
reputation appears to be influential in determining the extent of communica-
tion exchanged between governments and their service providers. Perhaps 
reputable vendors tend to be considered more as partner than agents and are 
treated as such. There is also some evidence that capacity leads to more fre-
quent contacts and coordination especially in terms of whether the jurisdic-
tion has a professional administrator. This is, in fact, the variable with the 
greatest substantive import in the Contacts and coordination model. The 
coefficients for Rural and Suburban are both in the posited direction, indicat-
ing that lack of capacity leads to less “hands-on” management; however 
neither reaches conventional levels of significance. Finally, the terms of the 
written contract are negatively related to the level of coordination occurring 
during contract execution. That is, more formally written contracts are more 
relationally managed, on this metric. This is an interesting result and supports 
our thesis that dual mechanisms are in place simultaneously. While public 
managers may feel the need to write contracts as formally as their service 
characteristics and the market environments allow, they are willing to coor-
dinate with vendors more frequently than might be expected given the speci-
ficity of the written documents, especially when they have the capacity to do 
so and the vendors are perceived to be highly reputable.
Lastly, turning to the Use of Discretion in Sanctioning model, we see that the 
only variable, other than contract terms, that is significantly related to the 
dependent variable is Expectation of continuity. This finding indicates that 
when the relationship is expected to continue, public managers are hesitant to 
impose sanctions mechanistically and, rather, are more likely to opt for negotia-
tion and compromise to correct deficient results. This variable is highly influen-
tial, with a 1-unit increase associated with a 31.6% increase in the likelihood of 
observing a 5 on the dependent variable, Use of discretion in sanctioning.10
As mentioned, Contract features is also significantly and positively 
related to the dependent variable, which suggests a close alignment rather 
than deviation between written contracts and management styles. This is a 
very impactful variable, even more so than Expectation of continuity. Unlike 
the coordination dimension, however, this finding does not support the mixed 
governance pattern evidenced in the Contacts and coordination model.
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Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we test the proposition that local governments adopt mixed 
governance strategies by deploying both formal and relational mechanisms 
to formulate and manage service contracts. We also expect that contract writing 
and implementation are shaped differently by a set of service, vendor, and 
jurisdictional characteristics. Overall, we find support from the responding 
cities that formal and relational mechanisms coexist in contracting governance 
regimes.
The presence of mixed governance schemes is first evidenced by our fac-
tor analysis, which suggests a clear divergence between the three contract 
feature variables and the frequency of contact and coordination variable. 
Written contract features included as an independent variable in the Contacts 
and Coordination and Use of Discretion in Sanctioning models affirm our 
suspicion of local managers utilizing mixed governance, especially in terms 
of developing formal structures for contracts but managing them “hands on” 
at the same time. However, public managers seem to be more bound by the 
specificity laid out in written sanction clauses when implementing penalties.
Our results also offer some evidence of the different factors affecting writ-
ten contract structures and management style. The findings from the three 
determinant models indicate that local governments seem to adhere to eco-
nomic theory when writing contracts but tend to deviate from it when actu-
ally managing the contracts. That is, they write formalistic contracts when 
services are perceived to have low transaction costs and vendor service mar-
kets are robust; however, such considerations do not appear to be overly 
influential in determining how rarely or frequently they collaborate with their 
vendors during implementation and how strictly or loosely they invoke for-
mal sanction mechanisms when noncompliance occurs. Rather, things like 
vendor reputation and the contracting government’s management capacity 
come to the forefront regarding the frequency of contact. Whether local gov-
ernments expect long-term relationships with their vendors seems to matter 
in determining how willing public managers are to negotiate instead of 
straightforwardly imposing sanctions.
There are several theoretical implications that can be drawn from our find-
ings. First, the results of this study question the conventional dichotomous 
understanding of governance (i.e., formal versus relational) found in the past 
contracting literature and call for a better articulation of the governance 
schemes practiced by local public managers. Pragmatic-minded local manag-
ers appear to blend formal and relational strategies, instead of adhering to 
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one or the other method, to pursue accountability and assertively manage 
contracts to the extent that their internal (e.g., management capacity) and 
external conditions (e.g., transaction cost nature of services) permit. A chal-
lenge for future research is to better ascertain under what circumstances dif-
ferent governance patterns emerge. Second, with relation to the challenging 
task of discovering such conditions, this study begins to identify various ser-
vice, vendor, and jurisdictional determinants that either facilitate or restrain 
the formal or relational aspects of governance arrangements. This study also 
suggests that local governance is a multidimensional concept where the 
structure and management of contracts are not necessarily aligned and may 
be affected by different sets of factors. The complexity and multidimensional 
aspects of local governance should be better accounted for in future scholarly 
efforts. Furthermore, there is a need to better understand the dimensions of 
management style. As our findings indicate, levels of contacts and coordina-
tion appear to be weakly and negatively related to contract specificity while 
sanctioning discretion seems to be strongly and positively related. Further 
exploration is needed to clarify when contract terms effectively constrain 
management behavior and when they do not.
Our findings also highlight the need to further explore the communica-
tions that occur between contracting governments and their vendors during 
contract implementation. Our measure simply captures the extent to which 
such activities take place. Future research should seek to explore the varying 
nature of the communications and whether different types of services (such 
as hard vs. soft) and vendors (such as nonprofit, for-profit, and other govern-
ment) are associated with different sorts of communications. A related 
question is whether higher levels of communication or certain types of com-
munications/interactions are associated with better performance. The answer 
to these questions could have important implications for practitioners. If 
more contacts and coordination (possibly, of certain types) improve the effi-
cacy of contracting and capacity is related to the volume of such interactions, 
this would be a strong argument that governments would be wise to invest in 
such resources.
We want to reiterate a final concern prior to closing. Our response rate and 
sample size are smaller than ideal. Further, jurisdictions with larger popula-
tions and those with council–manager forms of government are overrepre-
sented. These factors could adversely impact the generalizability of our 
findings and call for future efforts to confirm or refute them through the use 
of larger, more representative samples.
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Appendix A
List of Services Included in the Analyses
Hard Services Soft Services
• Residential solid waste collection
• Solid waste disposal
•  Tree trimming and planting on public  
rights of way
• Street repair
• Animal control/shelter
•  Operation of parking lots and  
garages
•  Traffic sign/signal installation/ 
maintenance
• Commercial solid waste collection
• Street/parking lot cleaning
•  Operation/maintenance of bus transit 
system
• Recycling
•  Operation/maintenance of  
paratransit system
• Sewage collection and treatment
• Snow plowing/sanding
•  Parking meter maintenance and  
collection
• Disposal of sludge
• Pest control
• Water treatment
•  Inspection/code enforcementDisposal 
of hazardous materials
•  Operation of mental health/mental  
retardation programs and facilities
• Program for the elderly
• Drug and alcohol treatment program
• Public health program
•  Workforce development/job training 
program
• Child welfare program
• Jail health services
• Homeless shelter
• Child care Jail operation
Appendix B
Measures Used in the Analysis
Dependent variables
Contract features An additive scale consisting of three 5-point ordinal indicators; 
thus the variable ranges from 3 to 15 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.749),  
such that:
1.  For the first variable, 1 indicates “contract is rebid regularly, 
regardless of incumbent performance” and 5 indicates 
“contract is not rebid unless incumbent discontinues service 
or has serious problems.”
(continued)
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Appendix B (continued)
2.  For the second variable, 1 indicates “contract explicitly 
spells out deliverables, performance measures, and reporting 
requirements” and 5 indicates “contract does not cover 
detailed requirements, but contract terms and obligations are 
mutually understood.”
3.  For the third variable, 1 indicates “contract explicitly lays out 
sanction clauses that contain specific and detailed penalties” 
and 5 indicates “contract does not have explicit sanction 
clauses that detail penalties.”
Contacts and 
coordination
A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “contacts and 
coordination with the vendor are rare during contract 
implementation” and 5 indicating “contacts and coordination 
with the vendor are very common during contract 
implementation.”
Use of discretion 
in sanctioning
A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “sanctions are imposed 
as written in the contract with little discretion or negotiation” 
and 5 indicating “negotiation often takes place without formal 
sanctioning and contract terms may be altered as a result.”
Independent variables
Service 
measurability
An additive scale consisting of two 5-point ordinal indicators, 
thus the variable ranges from 2 to 10 (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.799), such that:
1.  For the first variable, 1 indicates “tasks are standardized and 
easily defined” and 5 indicating “tasks require customization 
and are not easy to define.”
2.  For the second variable, 1 indicates “performance and 
service quality are easy to measure” and 5 indicating 
“performance is hard to measure and service quality is hard 
to determine.”
Asset specificity A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “due to the nature of 
the service or the clients served, incumbents do not have an 
advantage over other vendors and are easy to replace” and 5 
indicating “due to the nature of the service or specific needs 
of clients, incumbents have an advantage over other vendors 
and are difficult to replace.”
Ownership Two dichotomous variables identifying vendor type:
1.   “Nonprofit” scores 1 if the vendor is a nonprofit organization.
2.   “Other government” scores 1 if the vendor is another 
government agency. Hence, the comparison category is  
for-profit vendors.
(continued)
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Appendix B (continued)
Reputation A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “reputation of the 
vendor was not known prior to contracting and thus not 
considered in vendor selection” and 5 indicating “reputation 
of the vendor was well known prior to contracting and 
served as a deciding factor in vendor selection.”
Expectation of 
continuity
A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “it is very unlikely 
that we will have a continuing relationship with this vendor 
(including outside this contract)” and 5 indicating “it is highly 
likely that we will have a continuing relationship with this 
vendor (including outside this contract).”
Professional 
administrator
Dichotomous variable that scores 1 for council–manager 
(cities) and council-administrator (counties) forms of 
government.
Metro status Two dichotomous variables identifying vendor type:
1. “Rural” scores 1 if the jurisdiction is classified as rural.
2.  “Suburban” scores 1 if the jurisdiction is classified as 
suburban.Hence, the comparison category is urban 
jurisdictions.
Few vendors A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “there are many 
vendors available in the market to replace the incumbent” 
and 5 indicating “there are very few vendors in the market to 
replace the incumbent.”
Control variables
Political 
connections
A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “this vendor has 
essentially no political connections” and 5 indicating “this 
vendor is politically very well connected.”
County A dichotomous variable scoring 1 if the jurisdiction is a county
Population 2000 U.S. census population in millions (transformed to millions 
so variable scales are compatible).
Note: The 5-point scales referenced above represent the actual questions posed to the 
respondents. For each service for which they responded, they were asked to mark on a 
number line what they felt to be the appropriate answer ranging between the “1” and “5” 
options listed above.
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Appendix C
Comparison of Characteristics of the Municipalities  
in the Sample with the U.S., Overall ICMA List,  
and Requested ICMA List.a
Characteristic
United 
States, %
ICMA List 
(Overall), %
ICMA List 
(Requested), % Sample, %
Population  
 Less than 10,000 86.6a 54.7 0.0 0.0
 10,000-49,999 10.4 36.2 28.1 21.1
 50,000-249,999 2.6 8.2 64.5 73.4
 250,000 or greater 0.3 0.9 7.4 5.5
Region  
 Northeast 13.2b 21.1c 19.6 12.5
 North-central 32.5 30.8 24.6 21.1
 South 35.8 33.5 25.1 31.3
 West 18.5 14.7 30.7 35.2
Metro status  
 Central NA NA 43.7 36.7
 Suburban NA NA 51.4 58.6
 Independent NA NA 5.0 4.7
Form of government  
 Mayor-council NA NA 34.7 17.2
 Council–manager NA NA 62.6 82.0
 Commission NA NA 1.6 0.8
 Town meeting NA NA 1.1 0.0
 (n = 35,933) (n = 7,231) (n = 925) (n = 128)
Note: NA, not available.
aInformation on U.S. jurisdictions were available only for municipalities and not counties. 
Therefore, we dropped counties from our comparison. The municipality/county breakdown 
for each of the categories is as follows: United States, 35,933/3034 (U.S. Census Bureau 
2002); ICMA List (Overall), 7,231/3039 (ICMA’s academic researcher’s order form, available 
from ICMA); ICMA list (Requested), 925/1075 (authors’ calculations); Sample, 128/126 
(authors’ calculations).
bESRI (2003).
cThe ICMA order sheet did not break down region by municipalities and counties, so the 
numbers reported here are for the aggregate.
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Notes
 1.  Respondents were asked to record their answers for the 5-point scale questions 
by marking a number line with values running from 1 to 5. This allowed some 
to choose midrange values, such as 3.5. Such choices were not overly common 
and only accounted for about 3% of responses for the questions included in the 
analysis. Also, the only midrange options marked were midpoints. Therefore, 
our 5-point scales actually contain up to nine ordered response categories.
 2.  Our response rate is lower than we would like, but as illustrated above, every 
effort was made to increase it. We suspect our survey was, to some extent, a 
victim of the current economic climate in which local governments are dealing 
with unprecedented budget shortfalls leading to difficulty in maintaining staffing 
levels, among other issues, that might make it more difficult/unlikely they would 
have the resources or be willing to make an effort to fill out our survey. It is also 
worth mentioning that recent research into survey methods generally find lack of 
consistent relationships between low response rates and response bias (Groves 
2006) and, in the random-digit-dial (RDD) context, Keeter et al. (2006, 766) find 
“that achieving a higher response rate does not yield significantly different esti-
mates for the vast majority of questions.” While this finding is not directly appli-
cable to the current study, as we use a mail survey, there seems no obvious reason 
why tendencies toward bias should vary between the different methodologies.
 3.  It should be noted that while we have no definitive information on the distri-
bution of forms of governments in the United States, the requested ICMA list 
likely also has a disproportionately large number of council–manager jurisdic-
tions. For example, ICMA’s most recent municipal (2006) and county (2007) 
form of government surveys found 54.5% and 46.0% council–manager govern-
ments, respectively, as opposed to the 62.6% in the requested list. Overviews 
of both surveys can be downloaded from http://icma.org/en/results/surveying/
survey_research/survey_results (accessed April 15, 2011).
 4.  Like our other 5-point measures, some respondents marked half-points on the 
Contacts and coordination and Use of discretion in sanctioning variables 
(10 cases, 2.9%, for each variable). This is not problematic for the indepen-
dent variables, but it does pose an issue for dependent variables. While OLS 
seems appropriate for 9-point scales, it does not seem so in this instance owing 
to the paucity of half-point responses. We decided to go with ordered logit mod-
els instead. To do so, we rounded the half-points up and estimated the models, 
rounded down and estimated, and dropped the half-point responses and estimated. 
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This allowed us to compare the results for the various configurations. The results, 
reported in Table 4, are from the “round up” models. Across the models, the only 
differences were that Other government and Population both moved to marginal 
levels of significance (p = 0.090 and 0.093, respectively) in the round down 
version of the Contracts and Coordination model and Measurability moved to 
marginal significance (p = 0.097) in the drop version of the Use of Discretion in 
Sanctioning model. Interested readers can contact the authors for more informa-
tion on the sensitivity analyses.
 5.  Hausman tests were conducted using the “ivendog” command in Stata. For 
both the Contacts and Coordination and Use of Discretion in Sanctioning 
models, the null hypothesis that Contract features is exogenous could not be 
rejected (p = 0.452 and p = 0.495, respectively).
 6.  In addition to running the models separately, we also ran a path analysis, although 
this is not technically an appropriate model since both of the management style 
dependent variables are ordered (Garson 2008). The results were generally in 
line with those presented in Table 4, with the exceptions that there was evidence 
that Population might have an indirect effect on Contracts and coordination 
through its relationship with Contract features and Measurability appears to 
have an indirect effect on Use of discretion in sanctioning. Interested readers 
may contact the authors for further information in this regard.
 7.  That is, moving from its lowest score (2) to its highest score (10), it is associated 
with increasing the dependent variable 3.4 units. Since Contract features has a 
range of 12 (i.e., from 3 to 15), this means that maximum movement on Service 
measurability accounts for about 28.6% of the range of the dependent variable. 
On the other hand, Asset specificity ranges from 1 to 5. So, max movement on 
this variable translates to a 1.5 unit increase in the dependent variable which 
represents 12.5% of Contract features’s range.
 8.  The standard error for the hypothesis test of the difference between the coefficient esti-
mates was calculated as: se
OTHERGOVT-NP =
 9.  “Impact” is constructed by first setting all dichotomous variables at zero, all 
5-point ordered variables at 4, and continuous variables at their means. The 
baseline predicted probabilities for the five categories of the dependent variable 
are calculated from these settings. Doing so produces predicted probabilities of 
scoring 5 of 0.360 for Contacts and coordination and 0.133 for Use of discre-
tion in sanctioning. These compare favorably with the actual probabilities of 
such scores in the data set, which are 0.367 and 0.145, respectively. Next, in 
turn, the value associated with each statistically significant variable is increased 
by 1 (continuous variables by 1 standard deviation) and new probabilities are 
computed. “Impact” is calculated by the equation: P(5)
new
 – P(5)
baseline
 for each 
√var
OTHERGOVT
+var
NP
–2cov
OTHERGOVT,NP
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variable, and represents the change in the probability of the dependent variable 
scoring 5.
10.  Since the baseline probability of scoring 5 on the dependent variable is 13.3%, a 
4.2 percentage point increase represents a 31.6% increase.
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